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I. INTRODUCTION  
¶1 In In re Bilski, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, attempted to create a definitive 
test to determine whether a claimed process was patentable subject matter.1  The Federal 
Circuit declared, “A claimed process is surely patent-eligible under § 101 if: (1) it is tied 
to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a 
different state or thing.”2  When the Supreme Court granted certiorari,3 the collective 
patent community entered a period of uncertainty, as it was unclear whether the new 
“machine-or-transformation” test would pass muster with the Supreme Court and how the 
stricter standard for patent-eligibility would impact many of the different industries that 
depend on process patents to protect their innovations.4 
¶2 For all of the fanfare awaiting the Supreme Court’s decision, it was ultimately 
unsatisfying, as the Court chose to draft a narrow opinion on the patent-eligibility of the 
particular technology at issue in the case, and the Court refused to establish any definitive 
standard or multi-factor test for patent-eligibility across all technologies.5  Furthermore, 
while the Court accepted the machine-or-transformation test as a useful tool in 
determining patentability, the Court refused to accept it as the sole test.6  Rather, the 
 
* Northwestern University School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2011.  I dedicate this article to my parents, 
Phuong and Huong-Nga, for their unwavering support and for being the source of my drive and inspiration.  
I also thank my sister, Trang, for her enduring encouragement and willingness to always share a laugh.   
1 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
2 Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 (1981); Gottschalk v. Benson, 
409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972)).  
3 Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735, 2735 (2009). 
4 See  Lauren Katzenellenbogen et al., Alternative Software Protection in View of In re Bilski, 7 NW. J. 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 332 (2009) (discussing alternate means of intellectual property protection for the 
software industry, because it is unclear whether processes encoded in software for general purpose 
computers are sufficiently tied to a particular machine to qualify for protection under In re Bilski); 
Elizabeth Ruzich, In re Bilski and the Future of Business Method and Software Patents, 50 IDEA 103 
(2009) (critically reviewing the key decisions from the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences 
concerning business method and software patents that were decided shortly after In re Bilski was released). 
5 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229–30 (2010) (“Rather than adopting categorical rules that might 
have wide-ranging and unforeseen impacts, the Court resolves this case narrowly on the basis of this 
Court’s decisions in Benson, Flook, and Diehr, which show that petitioners’ claims are not patentable 
processes because they are attempts to patent abstract ideas.”).  
6 Id. at 3227 (“[T]he machine-or-transformation test is a useful and important clue, an investigative tool, 
for determining whether some claimed inventions are processes under § 101.  The machine-or-
transformation test is not the sole test for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible ‘process.’”). 
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Court warned that the machine-or-transformation test was developed from technologies 
of the Industrial Age, and it may be insufficient for the new technological fields that have 
blossomed with the Information Age7—such as “software, advanced diagnostic medicine 
techniques, and inventions based on linear programming, data compression, and the 
manipulation of digital signals.”8 
¶3 The Supreme Court’s warning raised significant concerns among the biotechnology 
industry about whether it could continue to use process patents to protect proprietary 
diagnostic techniques.9  However, the biotechnology industry can seek comfort in the 
Federal Circuit’s recent opinion in Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative 
Services.10  The patent at issue claimed a method for administering dosages of a class of 
drugs into the human body to optimize efficacy and minimize adverse effects.11  The 
Federal Circuit was presented with the question of whether the patent permissibly 
claimed a specific and practical application of a natural correlation, or whether the patent 
impermissibly claimed exclusive rights over all uses of the natural correlation.12  Despite 
the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Bilski v. Kappos, the Federal Circuit found that the 
machine-or-transformation test was still the appropriate standard for patent-eligibility.13  
Upon applying the machine-or-transformation test, the Federal Circuit found that this 
treatment method was patent-eligible, because the treatment method necessarily 
transformed the biochemical composition of the human body and the drug as they 
reacted.14  As this Note will explain, the machine-or-transformation test is over-inclusive 
when applied to the biotechnology industry, as the Prometheus Laboratories decision 
leaves the door open to granting process patents for even broader claims, such as medical 
treatments, surgical procedures, diagnostic methods, and other medical procedures. 
¶4 This Note will provide a critical analysis of the methods the Federal Circuit 
employed in Prometheus Laboratories to find that the claimed medical treatments were 
not patentable subject matter.  Furthermore, this Note will emphasize the disconnect 
between the manner in which the Federal Circuit applied the machine-or-transformation 
test in Prometheus Laboratories and the directive from the Supreme Court in Bilski to 
consider alternate standards for patent-eligibility.  Section II traces the history of the 
machine-or-transformation test as originally developed and characterized by the Supreme 
Court.  This section will explain how the machine-or-transformation test developed as 
one of the means to determine whether a patent that makes use of a natural phenomenon 
 
7 Id. (“The machine-or-transformation test may well provide a sufficient basis for evaluating processes 
similar to those in the Industrial Age . . . .  But there are reasons to doubt whether the test should be the sole 
criterion for determining the patentability of inventions in the Information Age.”). 
8 Id. (emphasis added). 
9 Brief for Biotechnology Industry Organization et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, 
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964), 2009 WL 2418478, at *5–6.  See also Brian P. 
Murphy & Daniel P. Murphy, Bilski’s “Machine-or-Transformation” Test: Uncertain Prognosis for 
Diagnostic Methods and Personalized Medicine Patents, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
755 (2010); Margaret Kubick, Comment, An Uncertain Future: The Impact of Medical Process and 
Diagnostic Method Patents on Healthcare in the United States, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 280 
(2010); Matthew D. Show, Note, A Dreadful Prognosis: Patentability of Diagnostic and Personalized 
Medical Procedures in the Wake of In re Bilski, 2 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 301 (2010). 
10 Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
11 Id. at 1349–50. 
12 Id. at 1354. 
13 Id. at 1355. 
14 Id. at 1355–56. 
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is so broad that it would preempt the entire use of the natural phenomenon.  Section III 
evaluates the manner that the Federal Circuit actually applied the machine-or-
transformation test in Prometheus Laboratories.  This part will suggest that the Federal 
Circuit applied the machine-or-transformation test rigidly and without full consideration 
of the purpose behind the test as articulated by the Supreme Court in Bilski.  Section IV 
will apply the machine-or-transformation test using the method described in Bilski to the 
facts presented in Prometheus Laboratories.  This Note concludes that the claims to 
medical treatment methods in Prometheus Laboratories are so broad that they preempt all 
applications of the natural phenomenon.  Especially for patents incorporating a natural 
phenomenon that is inherently transformative, a rigid application of the machine-or-
transformation test is inadequate, because the mere presence of a transformation is not 
sufficient to limit the scope of the patent claims to particular applications of the natural 
phenomenon.  Finally, Section V will challenge the Federal Circuit’s continued use of the 
machine-or-transformation test as a standard for patent-eligibility for process patents in 
the biotechnology industry.  This section will propose a refined framework that aligns the 
test for patentable subject matter with the purpose of having a patent-eligibility 
requirement. 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MACHINE-OR-TRANSFORMATION TEST 
A. Process Patents as Patentable Subject Matter 
¶5 Section 101 of Title 35 of the United States Code establishes the statutory 
categories for patent-eligible subject matter.  A patent may be granted to “[w]hoever 
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition 
of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”15  Processes have been explicitly 
listed as patent-eligible subject matter since they were added in the 1952 Amendments to 
the Patent Act.16  The Patent Act explicitly defines the term process to mean a “process, 
art or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, 
composition of matter, or material.”17  The self-referential definition of the term process 
proved to be an insufficient definition for the courts to apply.  The Supreme Court found 
that the ordinary sense of the word “process,” as required in a literal reading of the 
statutory definition, proved to be overly inclusive.18 
¶6 Instead of relying entirely on the statutory definition, the Supreme Court adopted 
general principles to determine whether a claimed procedure involving a series of steps 
falls within the Patent Act’s scope of the term process.  The Court recognized that the 
 
15 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
16 See Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 101, 66 Stat. 792 (1952).  Among the categories of 
patentable subject matter, the term process was added in the 1952 Patent Act in order to replace the term 
art.  S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952).  Congress was concerned that the meaning of the term art as used the 
in the Patent Act would be confused with the use of the term useful art in the Constitution and the term art 
in other statutes.  Id.  However, Congress clarified that the terms art and process as used in the Patent Act 
were intended to mean process or method.  Id.   
17 35 U.S.C. § 100 (1952).  
18 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588–89 & n.9 (1978) (explaining that a purely literal reading of the 
statutory definition of the term process opened the door for previously ineligible methods that simply 
claimed laws of nature). 
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term process should be interpreted broadly,19 because Congress intended the statutory 
categories for patent-eligibility to “include anything under the sun that is made by 
man.”20  However, “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” cannot 
receive patent protection.21  As a matter of policy, the Court has refused to recognize any 
patent laying claim to a natural phenomenon, because such phenomena exist outside of 
human intervention and are free to all people.22 
B. Process Patents Incorporating Natural Phenomenon 
¶7 The controversy over process patents arose from those inventions that were made 
by man but also incorporated the laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.  
The question became how much incorporation of the natural phenomenon was 
acceptable.  The Supreme Court drew a distinction between permissible patents that lay 
claim to a specific application of a natural phenomenon and impermissible patents that 
lay claim to the natural phenomenon itself.23  Patents that would wholly preempt all of 
the practical uses of a natural phenomenon were rejected as overly broad.24 
¶8 In response to this distinction, the Supreme Court foresaw attempts by patent 
prosecutors to draft artificial limitations upon a patent’s claims for the purpose of 
masking the fact that the patent actually laid claim to the natural phenomenon itself.25  In 
Diamond v. Diehr, the Supreme Court renounced the practice of adding artificial 
limitations—such as restricting the patent to a particular field of use—to circumvent the 
restriction on claiming the natural phenomenon itself.26  Otherwise, for example, a patent 
claiming a method to measure far distances by solving the Pythagorean Theorem could 
contain a final clause limiting the field of use to only land surveying techniques.27  The 
Supreme Court explained that merely limiting the use of a natural phenomenon to a 
particular technological environment did not cure the defect that the patent was laying 
claim to the natural phenomenon itself.28 
¶9 Similarly, the Supreme Court renounced the practice of adding artificial limitations 
upon a patent’s claims by drafting superfluous steps into the claimed process.  In Parker 
v. Flook, the patentee claimed a method for updating variable alarm limits during a 
catalytic conversion process.29  During the conversion process, data on changes in the 
 
19 Id. 
20 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting from S. REP. NO. 82-1979). 
21 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). 
22 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130–31 (1948). 
23 Id. at 130. 
24 E.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972) (finding a patent that used an algorithm to 
convert binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary numerals would wholly preempt the algorithm, 
because there were no substantial practical applications of the algorithm outside of the claimed scope of the 
patent). 
25 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92. 
26 Id.  
27 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 957 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 
(1978)). 
28 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191 (explaining “[a] mathematical formula as such is not accorded the protection of 
our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a 
particular technological environment”) (citation omitted). 
29 Parker, 437 U.S. at 585. 
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conditions—such as temperature, pressure, and flow rates—were constantly monitored.30  
An algorithm would interpret these measurements and periodically adjust the alarm limits 
to more accurately reflect the potential for abnormal circumstances.31  Even though the 
claimed process included additional steps beyond the claims to the algorithm—such as 
recalculating the values for the alarm limits—the Supreme Court found these additional 
steps to be insignificant “post-solution activity.”32  Insignificant post-solution activities 
cannot turn an otherwise ineligible claim into patentable subject matter.33  Since Parker 
v. Flook, the Federal Circuit has carefully examined any data-gathering steps to 
determine whether they are merely just insignificant post-solution activities.34  For a 
process patent that depends upon utilizing a natural phenomenon, the patent must have 
claims that limit the scope of the patent to a particular application of the natural 
phenomena, rather than simply adding field-of-use limitations or insignificant post-
solution activities. 
C. The Pattern of Patent-Eligible Machines or Transformations 
¶10 The machine-or-transformation test began as one of the methods to determine 
whether a patent’s claims were sufficiently limited to a particular application of a natural 
phenomenon to be patent-eligible under § 101.35  Analyzing a few key patents that were 
deemed to claim only a particular application of a natural phenomenon rather than the 
natural phenomenon itself, the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson recognized a 
pattern.36  The Supreme Court remarked that the “[t]ransformation and reduction of an 
article ‘to a different state or thing’ is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that 
does not include particular machines.”37  At the time, the Supreme Court was not 
prepared to establish this clue as the definitive standard for determining process patent-
eligibility.38  However, the Supreme Court grew more sympathetic to finding processes 
that were tied to a particular machine or transformation as patent-eligible.  For example, 
in Parker v. Flook, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “[a]n argument can be made, 
however, that this Court has only recognized a process as within the statutory definition 
 
30 Id.  
31 Id.  
32 Id. at 590. 
33 See id.  
34 E.g., In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 840 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (reasoning that a “step in the claim to derive 
data for the algorithm will not render the claim statutory”). 
35 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (recognizing that the Supreme Court developed the 
machine-or-transformation test “to determine whether a process claim is tailored narrowly enough to 
encompass only a particular application of a fundamental principle rather than to pre-empt the principle 
itself”). 
36 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70–71 (1972).  For example, the Supreme Court considered 
O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853), where Morse claimed a process for transmitting signals 
across distances using electromagnetism.  The Supreme Court rejected Morse’s final claim, because the 
final claim did not disclose specific machinery that Morse could use to harness the electromagnetic forces.  
The Supreme Court wanted to preserve the possibility for the future invention of another means to use 
electromagnetism to transmit signals. 
37 Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 70. 
38 Id. at 71 (“It is argued that a process patent must either be tied to a particular machine or apparatus or 
must operate to change articles or materials to a ‘different state or thing.’  We do not hold that no process 
patent could ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements of our prior precedents.”). 
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when it either was tied to a particular apparatus or operated to change materials to a 
‘different state or thing.’”39 
¶11 The Supreme Court had the opportunity in Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings 
v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. to clarify the test for patentable subject matter.40  The 
patent in Laboratory Corp. dealt with a process for diagnosing vitamin deficiency based 
on a patient’s homocysteine levels.41  The process at issue was essentially comprised of a 
first step to determine the concentration of a metabolite in a sample of body fluid and a 
second step to compare the determined concentration against pre-defined levels for 
diagnosis.42  The Supreme Court initially granted certiorari to determine “whether the 
patent claim is invalid on the ground that it improperly seeks to ‘claim a monopoly over a 
basic scientific relationship.’”43  Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court decided to 
revoke the grant of certiorari as improvidently granted.44 
¶12 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Stevens and Justice 
Souter, suggested that the patent at issue was invalid, because it claimed a natural 
phenomenon.45  Characterizing the patent claim as “no more than an instruction to read 
some numbers in light of medical knowledge,” Justice Breyer argued that the patent used 
abstract patent language to claim the correlation between homocysteine and vitamin 
deficiency, which is an unpatentable natural phenomenon.46  Unfortunately, Justice 
Breyer did not cite any standard for determining whether the patent was claiming a 
natural phenomenon, so no standard for determining patentable subject matter for process 
patents can be gleaned from Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion.47 
¶13 The Supreme Court most recently opined on the issue of patentable subject matter 
in response to the Federal Circuit’s adoption of the machine-or-transformation test in the 
Bilski case.48  Under the Federal Circuit’s machine-or-transformation test, a claimed 
 
39 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 n.9 (1978). 
40 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006).  
41 Id. at 129 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
42 The patent at issue claimed:  
A method for detecting a deficiency of cobalamin or folate in warm-blooded animals 
comprising the steps of:  
Assaying a body fluid for an elevated level of total homocysteine; and 
correlating an elevated level of total homocysteine in said body fluid with a 
deficiency of cobalamin or folate. 
U.S. Patent No. 4,940,658 col.41 (filed Nov. 20, 1986). 
43 Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 125 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
44 Id. at 125–26.   
45 Id. at 137–38. 
46 Id. 
47 Justice Breyer recognized that determining the scope of a phenomenon of nature is not easy to define.  
Id. at 134.  Deciding that the facts presented by Laboratory Corp. clearly claimed a natural phenomenon, 
Justice Breyer explained that this case “does not require us to consider the precise scope of the ‘natural 
phenomenon’ doctrine or any other difficult issue.”  Id. at 135. 
48 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  In addition to 
the machine-or-transformation test, the Federal Circuit and its predecessors have suggested other standards 
for determining patentable subject matter under § 101.  The Freeman-Walter-Abele Test emphasized that 
the claimed process must manipulate physical things.  In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 905 (C.C.P.A. 1982).  
Under the Freeman-Walter-Abele Test, a court must conduct a two-part analysis.  Id.  A court must first 
determine whether the claim directly or indirectly addressed a natural phenomenon.  Id.  If the patent 
relates to a natural phenomenon, the court must secondly determine whether the natural phenomenon is 
“applied in any manner to physical elements or process steps.”  Id. at 907 (quoting In re Walter, 618 F.2d 
 462
Vol. 9:7] Dan Hoang 
process must be tied to a particular machine, or it must transform an article into a 
different state or thing.49  After identifying the machine or transformation that limits the 
process to a particular application of the natural phenomenon, the process must satisfy 
two additional conditions.  First, the specific machine or transformed article “must 
impose meaningful limits on the claim’s scope to impart patent-eligibility.”50  Second, the 
involvement of the specific machine or transformed article must be more than 
insignificant extra-solution activities.51  These two conditions ensure that the claimed 
machine or transformation actually places a practical limitation upon the scope of the 
process so that the patent only lays claim to a specific application of the natural 
phenomenon. 
¶14 The Supreme Court held that the machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test 
for determining whether a claimed process is patentable under § 101.52  Indeed, nothing 
in the Patent Act dictates that a claimed process must be tied to a particular machine or 
must transform a particular article.53  Furthermore, while dicta from Supreme Court cases 
have referenced the machine-or-transformation test, the Supreme Court has never 
endorsed it as the exclusive test for patentability.54  Instead of relying on any bright-line 
rules, the Supreme Court looked to Benson, Flook, and Diehr to determine that the Bilski 
claim fell outside the bounds of § 101.55  Although the Supreme Court did not apply the 
machine-or-transformation test, the Court did not reject the machine-or-transformation 
test outright.  Instead, the Supreme Court declared that “the machine-or-transformation 
test is a useful and important clue, an investigative tool, for determining whether some 
claimed inventions are processes under § 101.”56 
III. PROMETHEUS LABORATORIES, INC. V. MAYO COLLABORATIVE SERVICES 
A. Procedural History 
¶15 Prometheus Laboratories is an important case that has followed Bilski’s path 
through the courts and has served as an indicator of how the Federal Circuit intends to 
apply the Bilski precedent.  The Federal Circuit’s first decision in Prometheus 
Laboratories was among the earliest opinions to apply the machine-or-transformation test 
after the Federal Circuit announced it.57  The Federal Circuit found that the claimed 
method was patent-eligible, because it was tied to a particular transformation.58  After the 
 
758, 769 (C.C.P.A. 1980).  Alternatively, the “useful, concrete, and tangible result” test emphasized the 
outcome of the claimed process.  Claiming a patentable subject matter depended on identifying a useful, 
concrete, and tangible result from the use of the natural phenomenon.  State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Signature Fin. Grp., Inc. 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  Leading into the Federal Circuit’s decision 
in In re Bilski, it was uncertain which one among these tests was the prevailing standard for patentable 
subject matter. 
49 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 961. 
50 Id. at 961–62.  
51 Id. at 962 
52 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226–27. 
53 Id. at 3226. 
54 Id. at 3226–27. 
55 Id. at 3229–30. 
56 Id. at 3227. 
57 Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
58 Id. at 1346. 
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Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Bilski case,59 the Court also chose to grant 
certiorari to Prometheus Laboratories for the same issue of patentable subject matter.60  
While Bilski concluded with the judgment from the Supreme Court, Prometheus 
Laboratories was remanded back to the Federal Circuit for further consideration in light 
of the new Bilski decision.61  The Federal Circuit has recently released its second decision 
in Prometheus Laboratories,62 which is among the earliest opinions by the Federal 
Circuit on the issue of patent-eligibility after the Supreme Court decision in Bilski. 
¶16 Applying a similar analysis as in its first decision, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed 
that the claimed method in Prometheus Laboratories was patentable subject matter.63  
Comparing the Federal Circuit’s reasoning in its first and second opinion provides insight 
into the Federal Circuit’s perception of how the Supreme Court’s decision in Bilski 
changed the doctrine of patent-eligibility.  In particular, the fact that the Federal Circuit 
applied the same reasoning in both of its opinions in Prometheus Laboratories, despite 
the Supreme Court’s invitation to adopt alternative standards for this type of 
technological field,64 suggests that the Federal Circuit does not view the Bilski case as a 
major game-changer to its prior decisions on patent-eligibility. 
B. Factual Background 
¶17 Prometheus Laboratories is the exclusive licensee of two patents that claim 
methods for treating immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorders.65  These disorders 
irritate and inflame the gastrointestinal tract, causing diarrhea, abdominal pain, and 
fever.66  In more severe cases, these disorders may require surgery to repair, and they 
place patients at an increased risk for developing intestinal cancer.67  These disorders can 
be treated with certain types of drugs that deliver 6-mercaptopurine and 6-thiogguanine to 
the patient, which help to alleviate the symptoms of the disorder.68  However, these drugs 
can be prone to complications, such as non-responsiveness and drug toxicity, which 
exacerbate the condition.69 
¶18 Prometheus Laboratories’ two patents seek to optimize the delivery of these drugs 
to improve efficacy and prevent any complications.  The first patent (’623 Patent) claims 
a “method of treating IBD/Crohn’s Disease and related conditions wherein drug 
 
59 Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009). 
60 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010). 
61 Id. 
62 Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
63 Id. at 1355 (“We do not think that either the Supreme Court’s GVR Order or the Court’s Bilski 
decision dictates a wholly different analysis or a different result on remand. . . .  [T]he Court did not 
disavow the machine-or-transformation test.  And, as applied to the present claims, the ‘useful and 
important clue, an investigative tool,’ leads to a clear and compelling conclusion . . . .”). 
64 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010) (“[T]here are reasons to doubt whether the [machine-
or-transformation] test should be the sole criterion for determining the patentability of inventions in the 
Information Age. . . .  [T]he machine-or-transformation test would create uncertainty as to the patentability 
of software, advanced diagnostic medicine techniques, and inventions based on linear programming, data 
compression, and the manipulation of digital signals.”). 
65 Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 





Vol. 9:7] Dan Hoang 
metabolite levels in host blood cells determine subsequent dosage.”70  The second patent 
(’302 Patent) claims “methods of optimizing drug therapeutic efficacy for treatment of 
immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorders.”71  The first claim in the ’623 Patent is 
representative of the claims at issue in both patents.72  The first claim in the ’623 Patent 
states: 
1. A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immune-
mediated gastrointestinal disorder, comprising:  
(a) administering a drug providing 6-thioguanine to a subject having said immune-
mediated gastrointestinal disorder; and 
(b) determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said subject having said immune-
mediated gastrointestinal disorder, 
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol per 8x108 red blood 
cells indicates a need to increase the amount of said drug subsequently 
administered to said subject and 
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 8x108 red 
blood cells indicates a need to decrease the amount of said drug subsequently 
administered to said subject.73  
The district court found that both patents recited a natural phenomenon in a manner that 
wholly preempted the use of that natural phenomenon.74  The district court first 
determined that the correlations recited in the wherein clauses are natural phenomena, 
because metabolizing 6-thioguanine naturally produces the desired therapeutic and toxic 
effects.75  Furthermore, the district court found that because the steps of administering 
and determining the levels of 6-thioguanine are merely data-gathering steps, the claims 
cover the correlations themselves.76  By claiming the correlations, the patent claimed all 
substantial practical applications of the correlations, which preempted the use of the 
natural phenomenon.77  However, based on its application of the machine-or-
transformation test, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s findings.78  The 
Federal Circuit found that both patents were sufficiently tied to the transformations of 
various articles to be patent-eligible.79 
 
70 Id. at [54]. 
71 U.S. Patent No. 6,680,302, at [54] (filed Dec. 27, 2001). 
72 Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
73 ’623 Patent col.20. 
74 Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., No. 04cv1200, 2008 WL 878910, at *5, *10–13 
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008). 
75 Id. at *9. 
76 Id. at *11. 
77 Id. 
78 Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1349–50 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
79 Id. at 1345–46. 
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C. Federal Circuit’s First Opinion in Prometheus Laboratories Prior to the Supreme 
Court’s Opinion in Bilski 
¶19 The Federal Circuit broke up the patents’ claimed process into three general steps.  
The first step (the administering step) claimed a process of administering the drug into 
the patient’s body.80  The second step (the determining step) claimed a process of 
determining the concentration of particular metabolites in the patient’s body.81  The third 
step (the mental step) claimed a mental process of comparing the determined 
concentrations against pre-established limits.82 
¶20 The Federal Circuit determined that the administering step inherently laid claim to 
the transformation of the body and the drug.83  As the drug is introduced into the body, 
the drug is metabolized in a series of biological and chemical reactions.84  The 
metabolizing of the drug and the resulting biochemical changes to the body provide the 
treatment that mitigates the symptoms of these immune-mediated gastrointestinal 
disorders.85  Since the purpose of the entire process is to optimize the treatment method 
for these immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorders, the Federal Circuit determined that 
the administering step was central to the claimed purpose.86 
¶21 The Federal Circuit was not deterred by the fact that the drug, once introduced into 
the body, metabolizes according to the natural biological and chemical processes.  
Agreeing with the position advocated by Prometheus Laboratories, the Federal Circuit 
explained that “quite literally every transformation of physical matter can be described as 
occurring according to natural processes and natural law.”87  Consequently, the Federal 
Circuit was not concerned that the claimed transaction operated by natural principles; 
rather, the Court emphasized that the process of administering the drug into the body is 
not itself a result of a natural process.88  In other words, so long as the claimed process 
sets up the conditions needed for the natural process to proceed, the Federal Circuit is 
satisfied that a patent for the process of setting up the conditions involves a 
transformation.   
¶22 Similarly, the Federal Circuit found that the determining step was tied to a 
particular transformation.89  The Federal Circuit recognized that determining the 
concentration of metabolite levels required the testing of a bodily sample from the 
patient.90  As the metabolites are extracted from the blood, the sample is transformed into 
a substance that is no longer human blood or human tissue.91  The Federal Circuit found 
that the determining step was central to the purpose of the overall process, because 
optimizing the efficacy and minimizing the toxicity of the drug during a course of 
 
80 Id. at 1346.  
81 Id. at 1347.  
82 Id. at 1348.  
83 Id. at 1346.  
84 Id.  
85 Id.  
86 Id. at 1345. 
87 Id. at 1346. 
88 Id.  
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treatment required getting accurate measurements of the concentration of these 
metabolites in the body.92  
¶23 The Federal Circuit was not concerned that some claims of the process did not 
describe a particular method for determining the concentration of the metabolites.  In 
particular, Claim 1 of the ’623 Patent, which the Court found representative of the 
independent claims at issue, is not tied to a particular procedure for determining the level 
of the metabolite.93  However, the Federal Circuit was satisfied that the determining step 
necessarily involved a transformation, because some of the dependent claims to the 
patent specify a method of manipulation for determining the concentration, such as high 
pressure liquid chromatography.94  
¶24 The Federal Circuit also found that the mental step did not detract from the patent-
eligibility of the entire process, despite recognizing that the mental step was entirely a 
mental process that did not transform any physical articles.95  The Federal Circuit 
declared that the presence of the mental step did not affect the patent-eligibility of the 
entire process, as long as the remaining steps, namely the administering and determining 
step, did lay claim to a transformation.96  
¶25 Finally, the Federal Circuit evaluated whether the entire three-step process wholly 
preempted the natural phenomenon—the correlations between metabolite levels and the 
efficacy or toxicity of the metabolites.97  The Federal Circuit’s preemption analysis 
simply provided a series of assertions that were based on its earlier conclusion that the 
administering and determining steps were tied to a transformation.  The extent of the 
Federal Circuit’s analysis is the assertions that “[t]he claims cover a particular application 
of natural processes to treat various diseases” and that “the claims do not preempt natural 
processes; they utilize them in a series of specific steps.”98  Illustrative of the Federal 
Circuit’s interpretation of the relationship between the machine-or-transformation test 
and the doctrine against the preemption of a natural phenomenon, the Federal Circuit 
explained that “because the claims meet the machine-or-transformation test, they do not 
preempt a fundamental principle.”99  Finding that the claims at issue were tied to a 
particular transformation, the Federal Circuit determined that the claimed process was 
patentable subject matter.100   
D. Federal Circuit’s Second Opinion in Prometheus Laboratories After the Supreme 
Court’s Opinion in Bilski  
¶26 On remand from the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit was directed to reconsider 
Prometheus Laboratories in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bilski.101  One of 
the biggest lessons illuminated by the Supreme Court’s decision was the importance of 
 
92 Id.  
93 See id. at 1340.  
94 Id. at 1347.  
95 Id. at 1348–49. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 1349. 
98 Id.  
99 Id.  
100 Id. at 1345–46.  
101 Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010).   
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choosing the appropriate standard for determining patentable subject matter.  While the 
Supreme Court considered the machine-or-transformation test to be a useful tool in 
determining patentable subject matter, the Court also cautioned that the machine-or-
transformation test was less useful for newly developed technologies, such as “advanced 
diagnostic medicine techniques.”102  Considering that the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari for Prometheus Laboratories prior to releasing its decision in Bilski, it stands to 
reason that explicitly listing “advanced diagnostic medicine techniques” served as an 
invitation for the Federal Circuit to consider alternative standards for patentable subject 
matter.  In fact, the Supreme Court explicitly stated, “[W]e by no means foreclose the 
Federal Circuit’s development of other limiting criteria [for patentable subject matter] 
that further the purposes of the Patent Act and are not inconsistent with its text.”103  
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit did not engage in a thorough analysis of potential 
alternative factors for patent-eligibility.  Rather, the Federal Circuit interpreted the 
Supreme Court’s decision as approval to use the machine-or-transformation as the 
primary basis, although not the exclusive basis, for its analysis of patentable subject 
matter.104   
¶27 Having accepted the machine-or-transformation test as an appropriate standard in 
this case, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed that the claimed process was patentable subject 
matter under § 101 for many of the same reasons previously expressed in the first Federal 
Circuit opinion.105  The claimed process passed the transformation prong, because 
“methods of treatment . . . are always transformative when one of a defined group of 
drugs is administered to the body to ameliorate the effects of an undesired condition.”106  
The claimed process does not preempt all uses of the correlation, because the 
administering and determining steps limit the scope of the claim to a particular 
application of the correlation.107  Even though the administering and determining steps 
gather useful data, the purpose of these steps is not merely for gathering data but also to 
serve integral functions in treating the patients.108  Consequently, the Federal Circuit held 
that the claimed process was patentable subject matter under § 101.109   
IV. APPLYING THE MACHINE-OR-TRANSFORMATION TEST TO  
PROMETHEUS LABORATORIES 
¶28 In deciding whether the claims at issue in Prometheus Laboratories were 
patentable subject matter, the Federal Circuit, in both of its opinions, applied the 
machine-or-transformation test rigidly without consideration of the broader role that the 
machine-or-transformation test played.  The machine-or-transformation test originated as 
a means “to determine whether a process claim is tailored narrowly enough to encompass 
 
102 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010).   
103 Id. at 3231.  
104 Prometheus Labs., 628 F.3d at 1355 (“The [Supreme] Court did not disavow the machine-or-
transformation test.  And, as applied to the present claims, the ‘useful and important clue, an investigative 
tool,’ leads to a clear and compelling conclusion, viz., that the present claims pass muster under § 101.”).   
105 Id. at 1355–56.  
106 Id. at 1356.  
107 Id. at 1356–57. 
108 Id. at 1358.  
109 Id. at 1359.  
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only a particular application of a fundamental principle rather than to pre-empt the 
principle itself.”110  Rather than whether the claimed process simply passes the machine-
or-transformation test, the standard for patent-eligibility of process claims that make use 
of natural phenomena should be whether the claimed process preempts the use of the 
principle.  The machine-or-transformation test can be used as a means to determine 
preemption, but passing the machine-or-transformation test should not be the end of the 
analysis.  This section will apply the machine-or-transformation test with an eye towards 
determining whether the claimed process is tailored narrowly enough to claim only 
particular applications of the natural phenomenon.  
¶29 While the Federal Circuit is focused on whether there was a transformation of a 
physical article into a different state or thing, this section concedes that the overall 
claimed process does involve the transformation of physical objects.  The biochemical 
composition of the human body changes as the drug is metabolized, so the human body is 
transformed by administration of drugs.  As the Federal Circuit correctly quoted from In 
re Bilski, “It is virtually self-evident that a process for a chemical or physical 
transformation of physical objects or substances is patent-eligible subject matter.”111  
Although the claims of the patent do relate to the physical transformation of various 
articles, the claimed process should still fail the machine-or-transformation test, because, 
as the Supreme Court has emphasized in Benson, Flook, and Diehr, there are additional 
conditions to ensure that the process is tailored narrowly to a particular application of the 
natural phenomenon.  The steps of the claim need to add meaningful limits to the scope 
of the claim.112  In addition, the steps of the claim need to be more than post-solution 
activities, so that the claims do not wholly preempt the use of the natural phenomenon.113   
¶30 In Prometheus Laboratories, the claims in the patent are not narrowly tailored to a 
particular application of the natural phenomenon.  Rather, the claims recite the necessary 
extra-solution steps that establish the conditions needed to use the natural phenomenon.  
The most telling evidence that Prometheus Laboratories’ patent claims should not be 
patentable subject matter is that there is no way to use the natural phenomenon within the 
claimed field-of-use without implicating Prometheus Laboratories’ patent.114  In other 
words, if a physician were to use the natural phenomenon—the correlation between 
 
110 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
111 Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting 
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962).  
112 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 961–62. 
113 Id.  
114 The district court was presented with arguments from Prometheus Laboratories concerning alternate 
uses of the natural phenomenon that were not implicated by the patent claim.  Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. 
Mayo Collaborative Servs., No. 04cv1200, 2008 WL 878910, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008), rev’d, 581 
F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  Prometheus Laboratories presented six possible uses of the natural 
phenomenon.  Id. at *12.  However, the district court determined that none of these uses had any practical 
application.  Prometheus Laboratories suggested that the correlations could be used to treat other disease 
besides autoimmune or gastrointestinal disorder, but the district court found that there were no known 
practical uses for this correlation outside of those claimed disorders.  Id.  Similarly, Prometheus 
Laboratories suggested that physicians would not violate the patent by determining the metabolite levels so 
long as they did not use the results for the purpose of adjusting the dosage of the drugs that provided the 
metabolite levels.  Id.  The district court reasoned that the physician would have no reason to determine the 
metabolite levels, if the physicians were not able to use the results to adjust the metabolite levels in their 
patients.  Id.  Therefore, the district court found that the correlations had “‘no substantial practical 
application’ outside of the context of the claims.”  Id. at *11.  
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metabolite levels and the efficacy or toxicity of the metabolites—to treat a patient, the 
physician would necessarily have to administer a drug that delivers the metabolite to a 
patient and determine the concentration of the metabolite once it is within the patient, 
which would infringe Prometheus’s patent.   
A. The Natural Phenomenon at Issue Is Unique 
¶31 The ultimate question in dispute is whether the patent claims are narrowly tailored 
to a particular application of a natural phenomenon or whether the patent claims are 
drafted in a manner that wholly preempts the use of the natural phenomenon.  In 
Prometheus Laboratories, the natural phenomenon at issue is the correlation between the 
concentration of certain metabolites in the body and the performance of the metabolites 
in treating various gastrointestinal disorders.115  This correlation is incorporated in the 
“wherein” clauses of the claim.116  If the concentration of 6-thioguanine is below 230 
pmol per 8x108 red blood cells, the metabolite is ineffective in mediating the symptoms 
from the disorder, and the drug dosage needs to be increased.117  However, if the 
concentration of the metabolite in the body is above 400 pmol per 8x108 red blood cells, 
the presence of such a high concentration can be toxic, and the amount of the drug 
administered needs to be reduced.118  The effect that varying levels of concentrations of 
the metabolites has on the body is entirely dictated by this natural phenomenon.  
¶32 Compared to prior cases involving process patents, the natural phenomenon at issue 
is unique because any and all uses of the natural phenomenon necessarily involve a 
transformation in the human body.  The natural phenomenon is rooted in the reaction of 
the human body in response to the presence of certain chemical and biological conditions.  
Consequently, even a patent that clearly preempts the entire use of the natural 
phenomenon would pass a rigid application of the machine-or-transformation test, as 
applied in Prometheus Laboratories, because the natural phenomenon necessarily 
initiates biochemical transformations.  For natural phenomena that are inherently 
transformative, it is especially important for the court to analyze carefully whether the 
steps of the process add meaningful limits and are more than insignificant extra-solution 
activities in order to avoid entirely preempting the use of the natural phenomena.  
B. The Administering Step Adds No Meaningful Limits on the Natural Phenomenon 
¶33 Claim 1 of the ’623 Patent comprises a step of “administering a drug providing 6-
thioguanine to a subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder.”119  
 
115 See Prometheus Labs., 581 F.3d at 1349. 
116 The “wherein” clauses of the claim establish:  
[W]herein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol per 8x108 red blood cells 
indicates a need to increase the amount of said drug subsequently administered to said 
subject; and 
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 8x108 red blood cells 
indicates a need to decrease the amount of said drug subsequently administered to said 
subject.  
’623 Patent col.20. 
117 Id. 
118 Id.  
119 ’623 Patent col.20. 
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Although the words of the administering step only lay claim to the human act of 
delivering the metabolite into the human body, the practical effect of the administering 
step is to claim the biochemical reactions between the metabolite and the human body.   
¶34 In its application of the machine-or-transformation test, the Federal Circuit 
expanded the scope of the administering step to encompass the biochemical reactions 
resulting from the introduction of the metabolite into the human body.  The administering 
step passed the Federal Circuit’s application of the machine-or-transformation test, 
because the Federal Circuit imputed the transformative effect of the natural phenomenon 
onto the human act of delivering the drug into the human body.120  The Federal Circuit 
emphasized that the transformation in the administering step is “the effect on the body 
after metabolizing the artificially administered drugs.”121  So, even though, in form, the 
administering step is claiming the human action of administering the metabolite, in 
practice, the administering step also recites the biochemical reactions that result from 
administering the metabolite.  
¶35 The administering step is so broad that it entirely preempts any use of the natural 
phenomenon.  In order to use the claimed natural phenomenon—the correlations between 
the active metabolite and its efficacy and toxicity in the body—the active metabolite 
would need to be administered into the body.  A step calling for the administration of the 
metabolite does not limit the scope of the claim to fit a narrowly tailored application of 
the natural phenomenon.  Rather, the act of administering the drug is a necessary step that 
establishes the conditions needed to use the natural phenomenon.  Although the 
administering step is worded in such a way to make it seem as if it is an independent step 
of the process, the administering step does not limit the use of the natural phenomenon to 
a particular application, because administering the drug that provides the metabolite is an 
antecedent step that is common to all applications of the correlation associated with the 
metabolite levels.  Since any use of this natural phenomenon requires the administration 
of the metabolite, the administering step adds no meaningful limits on the claims to using 
the natural phenomenon. 
C. The Determining Step Is Merely a Data-Gathering Step 
¶36 The Federal Circuit erred in its analysis of the determining step by glossing over 
the argument that the determining step was merely a data-gathering step.  The 
determining step entails “determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said subject having 
immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder.”122  The transformation prong of the 
machine-or-transformation test requires the process to transform an article into a different 
state or thing.123  “The transformation must be central to the purpose of the claimed 
process.”124  Otherwise, a clever patent prosecutor can add insignificant steps to the 
process that do not tie the claimed process to a particular application of the natural 
phenomenon.   
 
120 Prometheus Labs., 581 F.3d at 1346. 
121 Id.  
122 ’623 Patent col.20.  
123 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 961–62 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
124 Id. at 962. 
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¶37 The only purpose of the determining step is to gather information about the 
concentration of the active metabolite in the body, which is needed to make use of the 
natural correlation between the concentration of the active metabolite and the human 
body’s reaction to the active metabolite.  Although determining the concentration of the 
metabolite in the body would necessarily involve biochemical reactions that transform 
the original bodily sample, this transformation is not central to the purpose of the claimed 
process.  The utility of the patent comes from its ability to create an effective treatment 
method, rather than its ability to determine the concentration of the metabolite.  
Furthermore, the wording of the determining step does not enumerate any of the methods 
used to calculate the concentration of the metabolite.125  The lack of enumerated methods 
for determining the concentration of the metabolite suggests that the claims of the patent 
are more focused on the natural phenomenon than on the transformations that occur 
during a particular procedure that determines the concentration of the metabolites.126  The 
transformation associated with performing biochemical tests to determine the 
concentration of the metabolites is not sufficient to make the entire claimed process pass 
the machine-or-transformation test.  
¶38 In prior cases, the Federal Circuit has not recognized performing diagnostic tests as 
being central to process patents for medical treatments.  In In re Grams, the Federal 
Circuit was presented with a proposed patent claiming, “A method of diagnosing an 
abnormal condition in an individual.”127  The process entailed collecting data from 
clinical trials and inputting the data into an algorithm.128  The only step of the process that 
potentially implicated a physical transformation was a step of “performing said plurality 
of clinical laboratory tests on the individual [sic] to measure the values of the set of 
parameters.”129  The Federal Circuit determined that the performance of the clinical 
laboratory tests merely involved gathering data, which would be used in an algorithm to 
optimize the diagnosis of an abnormal condition.130  Recognizing that any use of a 
particular algorithm would require antecedent steps in order to collect the necessary 
values to input into the algorithm, the Federal Circuit acknowledged that these data-
gathering steps were necessary in any process that claims to use an algorithm.131  
However, regardless of how necessary the data-gathering steps are to the use of the 
algorithm, these antecedent steps could not make a process claim into patentable subject 
matter.132  Otherwise, every patentee attempting to lay claim to an algorithm could craft 
the claims into a series of steps involving collecting the data, applying the algorithm, and 
measuring the resulting value.133  Similarly, the claims in Prometheus Laboratories 
artificially break the process into a series of insignificant steps.  The determining step is 
 
125 The full extent of the determining step in Claim 1 of the ’623 Patent disclosed a step consisting of 
“determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal 
disorder.”  ’623 Patent col.20. 
126 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963 (“A requirement simply that data inputs be gathered—without 
specifying how—is a meaningless limit on a claim to an algorithm because every algorithm inherently 
requires the gathering of data inputs.”).  
127 In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 836 (Fed. Cir. 1989).  
128 Id. at 836–37. 
129 Id. at 836. 
130 Id. at 839.  
131 Id. at 839–40. 
132 Id.  
133 Id.  
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an antecedent step to making use of the natural phenomenon and does not add any 
meaningful limits upon the claim to the natural phenomenon.  
¶39 The Federal Circuit should have recognized that the determining step was another 
necessary part of any use of the natural phenomenon.  Determining the concentration of 
the metabolites did not limit the scope of the claims to a particular application of the 
phenomenon; rather, the broad claim for determining the concentration allowed the patent 
holder to expand the claims of the patent to any use of the claimed phenomenon.   
D. The Mental Step Is Insufficient to Establish Patentable Subject Matter 
¶40 The first mental step in the ’623 Patent states that a “level of 6-thioguanine less 
than about 230 pmol per 8x108 red blood cells indicates a need to increase the amount of 
said drug subsequently administered to said subject.”134  The second mental step in the 
’623 Patent states that a “level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 8x108 
red blood cells indicates a need to decrease the amount of said drug subsequently 
administered to said subject.”135  These mental steps describe the natural phenomenon 
that the patent attempts to monopolize.  The mental step does not transform a particular 
article into a different state or thing, because these steps merely indicate the 
appropriateness of future treatment options.  In fact, fulfilling the mental step does not 
explicitly require any action.  The mental step merely provides a set of rules based on the 
correlation between the concentration of the metabolite and the efficacy and toxicity of 
the drug.  Since the mental step does not transform an article into a different state or 
thing, the mental step by itself is insufficient to establish patentable subject matter.  The 
permissibility of claiming the mental step depends upon the existence of additional steps 
that fulfill the machine-or-transformation test.   
E. The Claimed Process Preempts All Uses of the Natural Phenomenon 
¶41 In order to pass the transformation prong of the machine-or-transformation test, the 
claimed process must contain a transformation that is central to the purpose of the 
claimed process.136  For process patents that make use of natural phenomenon, this 
transformation must impose meaningful limits on the claim’s scope to prevent the patent 
from laying claim to all uses of the natural phenomenon.137  The purpose of the process in 
the ’623 Patent is to treat gastrointestinal disorders by administering a drug that provides 
a metabolite that ameliorates the symptoms of the disorder.  The transformation that is 
central to this claimed process is the series of biochemical reactions that occur between 
the metabolite and the body.  
¶42 The ’623 Patent involves three types of steps: an administering step, a determining 
step, and mental steps.  While the administering step incorporates the transformation of 
metabolizing the metabolite in the body, the administering step imposes no meaningful 
limits that restrict the scope of the claimed process to only a particular application of the 
natural phenomenon.  Since any use of the natural phenomenon requires administering 
 
134 ’623 Patent col.20. 
135 Id.  
136 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  
137 Id. at 961–62.  
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the metabolite into the body, the administering step is functionally preempting the entire 
use of the natural phenomenon.  Similarly, the determining step is not sufficient to turn 
an otherwise ineligible process patent into patentable subject matter.  While the 
determining step involves transforming the bodily sample to measure the concentration of 
the metabolite, this transformation is not central to the purpose of the claimed process.  
Rather, the determining step is an insignificant extra-solution activity to gather data to 
make use of the natural phenomenon, which is not sufficient to pass the machine-or-
transformation test.  Finally, the mental steps can be accomplished without any 
transformations, so the mental steps cannot pass the machine-or-transformation test.  
Since none of the individual steps is narrowly tailored to a particular application of the 
natural phenomenon, the practical effect of the ’623 Patent is to preempt all of the uses of 
natural phenomenon; so, the patent impermissibly lays claim to non-patentable subject 
matter.  
V. REFINING THE FRAMEWORK TO DETERMINE PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER FOR 
PROCESS PATENTS 
¶43 The challenge with the machine-or-transformation test is that the Federal Circuit 
has attempted to synthesize a definitive test from a patchwork of Supreme Court cases 
that have redefined the rules as technology has evolved.138  The test for determining 
whether a claimed process passes the § 101 threshold should return to its original 
purpose, which was to delineate between those processes that claimed a natural principle 
itself and those processes that claimed a particular application of the natural principle.  
Instead of adopting a definitive test, this Note proposes a four-step framework to analyze 
patentability based on the principles established by the Supreme Court and the Federal 
Circuit.   
¶44 The first step to analyzing a claimed process is to determine whether the claim 
incorporates a natural principle.139  Since Congress intended patentability to be a low 
threshold that should include “anything under the sun that is made by man,” most 
claimed processes will not raise concerns over incorporating these types of natural 
principles.140  However, there are certain key features to a claimed process that trigger 
concerns over patentability.  For example, claims that mention a law of nature as the 
driving force of the process, recite correlations or algorithms, or manipulate abstract 
relationships should raise concerns over patentability.141   
 
138 The Supreme Court has been hesitant to make passing the machine-or-transformation test a necessary 
condition for patentability.  The Supreme Court has described the machine-or-transformation test as the 
clue to patentability and has acknowledged that only processes that have passed the machine-or-
transformation test have been found patentable.  Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972); Parker v. 
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 n.9 (1978).  However, the Supreme Court has never made the machine-or-
transformation test the definitive standard for patentability.  
139 Use of the term natural principle is intended to serve as a shorthand for the category of laws of 
nature, natural phenomena, and natural ideas.  
140 S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952). 
141 See, e.g., O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 86 (1853) (recognizing that a claim to using 
electromagnetism for communication at distances raises concerns that the patentee was laying claim to a 
law of nature); Parker, 437 U.S. at 585–86 (recognizing that a claim that recited an algorithm raises 
concerns that the patentee was claiming a natural phenomenon); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature 
Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (recognizing that a claim to a method of manipulating 
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¶45 Once it is determined that a claim incorporates a natural principle, the second step 
is to define the scope of these natural principles.  This task is a difficult but essential step 
in delineating between claims over the natural principle itself and claims over a particular 
application of the natural principle.  Defining the scope of the natural principle entails a 
critical analysis of the relationships that the natural principle describes.  The court must 
evaluate the practical applications of the natural principle.  A law of nature that dictates 
the relationship of all of the objects of the universe should have a broad scope.  
Conversely, claims to correlations and algorithms that describe the relationship between 
specific objects should have a narrow scope that is limited to the field in which all of the 
specific objects are present.  The scope of the natural principle is the set of all of the 
practical applications of the natural principle.  
¶46 The third step removes all of the artificial limitations that patent drafters add to 
break a claim into a series of insignificant steps.  If every practical use of the natural 
principle would entail performing the claimed step, it is an artificial limitation.  In other 
words, artificial limitations include the data-gathering steps or insignificant extra-solution 
activities, which do not add any meaningful limitations to claimed process.  The purpose 
of this step is to remove any superfluous language and to focus on the heart of the claim.  
¶47 The final step analyzes whether the claim preempts all practical uses of the natural 
principle.  One means to perform a preemption analysis is the machine-or-transformation 
test.  In performing this test, the court should focus on the claim’s relationship to a 
particular machine or particular article.  Whether a claim is defined narrowly enough to 
focus only on a particular machine or particular article, and thereby only claim a 
particular application of the natural principle, should depend on the scope of the natural 
principle.  If all of the practical applications of the natural principle necessarily use the 
type of machine or article claimed in the patent, then the claim would preempt all uses of 
the natural principle.  Alternatively, a more concrete method of determining preemption 
is having the patentee describe other practical applications of the natural principle that the 
claim does not cover.  Alternate practical uses of the natural principle that are not covered 
by the patent are the ultimate proof that a patent only claims a particular application of a 
natural principle as opposed to the natural principle itself.  
¶48 This framework for a patentability analysis only slightly refines the method for 
performing the machine-or-transformation test.  One of the important modifications for 
this framework is the emphasis on defining the scope of the natural principle.  While 
courts may have identified the natural principle in the past, courts have not focused their 
analysis on the various applications of the natural principle.142  Determining the potential 
applications of the natural principle is essential to identifying the presence of artificial 
limitations on the claim that merely break the use of the natural principle into 
insignificant steps.  Similarly, determining the potential applications of the natural 
principle is essential to analyzing whether the patent preempts all practical uses of that 
principle.  
¶49 Another important modification is the rearranged order of analysis.  Instead of 
having the machine-or-transformation test headline the analysis, the antecedent steps 
 
mutual funds raises concerns of patenting an abstract idea).  
142 See, e.g., Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(failing to give sufficient weight to the district court’s factual finding that the natural phenomenon had no 
practical applications outside of the claimed invention).   
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narrow the factual issues to allow the court to focus on the key issue of whether the 
patent claims the natural principle itself or merely an application of the natural principle.  
This framework for determining patent-eligibility highlights the important issues that the 
Supreme Court has analyzed in Benson, Flook, Diehr, and Bilski.  By streamlining this 
analysis, it is more likely that the courts will provide reasoned analysis for each issue, as 
opposed to merely asserting general conclusions.  
VI. CONCLUSION  
¶50 In adopting the machine-or-transformation test, the Federal Circuit wanted to 
determine whether a patent’s claims involving a natural phenomenon were tailored 
narrowly enough to encompass a particular application of the natural phenomenon rather 
than the natural phenomenon itself.  In addition to determining whether the claims were 
tied to a particular machine or whether the claims transformed a particular article, the 
Federal Circuit wanted courts to evaluate the substance of the claims to ensure that they 
fulfilled the Federal Circuit’s policy objectives.  Consequently, the Federal Circuit 
required that the claimed steps to the process impose meaningful limitations upon the 
scope of the process and be more than insignificant extra-solution activities.  
¶51 When the Federal Circuit was first presented with the patent in Prometheus 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services, the Federal Circuit’s analysis centered 
on identifying the qualifying transformations and proving that the transformations were 
central to the purpose of the overall process.  However, the existence of the qualifying 
transformation was never at issue for Mayo Clinic.  Rather, Mayo Clinic’s argument and 
the district court’s opinion emphasized that the steps involved in the process did not limit 
the scope of the claimed process.  When the Federal Circuit was again presented with 
Prometheus Laboratories’ patents on remand from the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit 
ignored the Supreme Court’s invitation to experiment with alternative standards for 
patentable subject matter that would be more attuned to modern technologies.  
¶52 Under this Note’s proposed framework for patent-eligibility, the claimed process in 
Prometheus Laboratories would not have passed the threshold § 101 requirement.  The 
administering and determining steps are necessary steps for any use of the natural 
phenomenon—namely, the correlation between the concentration of the metabolite and 
the efficacy and toxicity of the drug.  Since any use of the natural phenomenon would 
require the administration of the drug and determination of the concentration of the 
metabolite, the patent preempted the entire use of the natural phenomenon.  Even the 
Federal Circuit’s decision does not suggest a manner of using the natural phenomenon 
without implicating Prometheus Laboratories’ claims.  If the Federal Circuit had focused 
on the broader implications of Prometheus Laboratories’ patents, the Federal Circuit 
would have come to the conclusion that the patents impermissibly preempt the use of a 
natural phenomenon, so they should not have been eligible for patenting.   
